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Deficient cognitive top-down executive control has long been hypothesized to underlie
inattention and impulsivity in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). However,
top-down cognitive dysfunction explains a modest proportion of the ADHD phenotype
whereas the salience of emotional dysregulation is being noted increasingly. Together,
these two types of dysfunction have the potential to account for more of the phenotypic
variance in patients diagnosed with ADHD. We develop this idea and suggest that top-
down dysregulation constitutes a gradient extending from mostly non-emotional top-
down control processes (i.e., “cool” executive functions) to mainly emotional regulatory
processes (including “hot” executive functions). While ADHD has been classically linked
primarily to the former, conditions involving emotional instability such as borderline
and antisocial personality disorder are closer to the other. In this model, emotional
subtypes of ADHD are located at intermediate levels of this gradient. Neuroanatomically,
gradations in “cool” processing appear to be related to prefrontal dysfunction involving
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and caudal anterior cingulate cortex (cACC),
while “hot” processing entails orbitofrontal cortex and rostral anterior cingulate cortex
(rACC). A similar distinction between systems related to non-emotional and emotional
processing appears to hold for the basal ganglia (BG) and the neuromodulatory
effects of the dopamine system. Overall we suggest that these two systems could
be divided according to whether they process non-emotional information related to
the exteroceptive environment (associated with “cool” regulatory circuits) or emotional
information related to the interoceptive environment (associated with “hot” regulatory
circuits). We propose that this framework can integrate ADHD, emotional traits in
ADHD, borderline and antisocial personality disorder into a related cluster of mental
conditions.
Keywords: ADHD, emotional instability, top-down regulation, prefrontal, cingulate
INTRODUCTION
Arguably, altered regulation of information processing represents the core underlying
mechanism for many psychiatric disorders. Such aberrations can affect multiple dimensions,
including both non-emotional and emotional processes. Currently, some disorders are
conceptualized as dysfunction of one or the other of these dimensions. For example,
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is defined on the basis of dysfunctional regulation
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 1 May 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 70
Petrovic and Castellanos Integrative Model of Top-Down Dysregulation
of non-emotional information processing (including inattention,
impulsivity and hyperactivity), whereas disorders such as
borderline personality disorder (BPD), antisocial personality
disorder (ASPD) and conduct disorder (CD) entail symptoms
reflecting emotional instability associated with dysfunctional
regulation of emotional processes. Other disorders involving
emotional instability include intermittent explosive disorder
and oppositional defiant disorder (ODD). Traditionally, these
psychiatric disorders have been studied separately, reflecting
their historical categorical divisions, and the tendency of
investigators and disciplines to reify such distinctions. However,
these historical distinctions are increasingly appreciated as
having impeded understanding of specific disorders in relation
to each other. In this Hypothesis and Theory article, we
propose that dysregulation in these different dimensions can be
incorporated into a unified model.
Although disorders that include persistent emotional
dysregulation differ in many symptoms, recent neurocognitive
research results suggests common features are involved in
emotional dysfunction. These ‘‘emotional instability disorders’’
are characterized by emotional hyper-responsiveness in
amygdala and insula, regions involved in shaping emotional
responses and experience (Blair, 2010; Rubia, 2011; Blair
et al., 2014; Glenn and Raine, 2014; Krause-Utz et al.,
2014). Structurally, the gray matter volumes of amygdala
and insula are often reduced in such disorders (Blair, 2010;
Rubia, 2011; Blair et al., 2014; Glenn and Raine, 2014;
Krause-Utz et al., 2014). These observations suggest that a
more general approach to study emotional instability may
reveal insights into common underlying mechanisms. In this
article, we will illustrate our thesis by focusing on ADHD and
BPD. Less emphasis will be placed on CD and ASPD since
these disorders also include sub-populations with callous-
unemotional traits that are associated with decreased behavioral
and neural responding to emotional stimuli, potentially
confounding the contribution from emotional instability
traits (Blair, 2010, 2013; Rubia, 2011; Blair et al., 2014).
We believe the literature on the neurobiology of ODD and
intermittent explosive disorder is currently insufficient to
warrant their inclusion in this illustrative essay, although the
approaches we highlight should also be applicable in future
studies.
Several reviews and theoretical articles have recently discussed
how top-down regulation in ADHD differs in comparison to
specific emotional instability disorders including BPD (Sebastian
et al., 2014) and CD (Rubia, 2011; Blair et al., 2014). The
difference between putative regulatory systems involved in
classical ADHD and emotional variants of ADHD has also been
noted (Castellanos et al., 2006). Here we focus on the relationship
between ADHD and emotional instability disorders in general.
Instead of emphasizing their many differences, we seek to place
these disorders in a common theoretical framework.
In more detail, we will put forward a model in which ADHD
and emotional instability disorders are mechanistically related.
We will argue that the fundamental problem in both types
of disorders is a similar dysfunctional top-down regulation of
information processing, in which the difference between the two
types of categorical disorders (ADHD vs. emotional instability
disorders) is whether the dysfunctional top-down regulation is
associated with emotional (and interoceptive) processing or non-
emotional (and exteroceptive) processing (Hypothesis 1). Given
that the disorders are mechanistically related we also hypothesize
that the symptoms associated to one type of dysregulation
will be overly represented in patients that have the disorder
associated with the other type of dysregulation—even when there
is no explicit comorbidity (Hypothesis 2). Thus, a dimensional
approach would better describe the existing phenotypes than
categorical distinctions. Finally, if the underlying mechanisms
are similar, treatments proven to be efficacious for one category
of disorders should also be efficacious for the other category
of disorders (Hypothesis 3). This could open new important
possibilities for treatment.
We first discuss a dimensional approach to psychiatric
disorders, as this is central for understanding the relation
between emotional and non-emotional dysregulation in clinical
populations. We then take up the relation between non-
emotional executive functions (‘‘cool’’ executive functions) and
ADHD. Given that executive functions are fundamentally
associated with ADHD, we then review the underlying prefrontal
networks in the brain mediating such top-down control and
show that these systems are altered in ADHD. A similar review
will be done for emotion associated (‘‘hot’’) executive functions
and emotional regulation, and their relation to emotional
instability disorders as well as for ‘‘emotional’’ traits in ADHD.
We then discuss how systems mediating emotional and non-
emotional top-down regulation (and dysregulation) relate to
each other in prefrontal, striatal and dopamine networks. We
will also discuss how this stratification between emotional and
non-emotional regulation could be discussed in terms of systems
related to interoceptive and exteroceptive processing. Finally, we
present a model that can incorporate both ADHD and emotional
instability disorders based on the relationship between these top-
down regulatory systems.
CATEGORICAL AND DIMENSIONAL
APPROACHES TO PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
In psychiatry, the adoption of the third edition of the Diagnostic
and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM; American
Psychiatric Association, 1980) initiated the practice of defining
psychiatric disorders as present or absent depending on whether
a minimum number of clinical criteria were satisfied. This
categorical approach enhanced the reliability of psychiatric
diagnoses, but it has not advanced our understanding of
underlying mechanisms (Insel et al., 2010; Cuthbert and Insel,
2013). One problem is that many psychiatric symptoms are
continuously distributed in the general population. Truncating
the range of variation by applying arbitrary cut-points impedes
an understanding of underlying mechanisms since it does
not mirror the true relationship between symptom levels and
neurocognitive levels. Moreover, only focusing on psychiatric
disorders excludes data from healthy individuals that are not
treated with medication nor show any comorbidities—factors
that confound categorically based research. Another problem is
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that defining disorders categorically based on whether criteria
cut-points are met increases heterogeneity. Two patients can
differ on nearly every symptom and still receive the same
diagnosis. Moreover, in existing categorical diagnostic systems
such as the 5th edition of the DSM (DSM-5; American
Psychiatric Association, 2013) or the 10th edition of the
International classification of diseases (ICD-10; World Health
Organization, 2011), a particular diagnosis can be partially
defined by opposite symptoms. For example, patients with
depression can sleep too much or too little, have increased
or decreased appetite, or increased or decreased activity levels.
Logically, different underlying mechanisms could mediate
these behaviors—although an alternative hypothesis is that
both extremes become more likely when a regulatory process
is dysfunctional (Klein, 1999). Accordingly, investigators are
being urged to focus on specific fundamental behavioral
components that may be altered in multiple psychiatric disorders,
such as attention or emotional regulation as a part of the
Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiated by the USA
National Institute of Mental Health (NIHM; Insel et al.,
2010; Cuthbert and Insel, 2013). Variation of such functions
in the general population has specifically been identified
as a promising way to understand dysfunction in these
systems.
By focusing on how information is processed on a systems
level, cognitive neuroscience has been successful in describing
mechanisms underlying normative human perception and
behavior (Gazzaniga, 2014). A major challenge for cognitive
neuroscience is to translate such basic knowledge of brain
function to psychiatric disorders. From a cognitive neuroscience
perspective, specific cognitive processes underlie particular
behaviors—here we term those cognitive core processes. Building
on previously given examples of fundamental behavioral
components from the RDoC such as attention and emotional
regulation, we define cognitive core processes as the underlying
neuronal mechanisms, on a system level, needed to produce
a given behavior. There are many different attentional and
emotional regulation processes and each process may include
multiple aspects. For example, ample data suggest that amygdala
modulates visual processing of threat cues (Vuilleumier and
Driver, 2007; Vuilleumier, 2015). The specific modulation of
amygdala on information processing in visual cortex may
then be defined as a cognitive core process. Dysfunctions
in these processes underpin the fundamental behavioral
components that are coupled to different psychiatric states
(Insel et al., 2010; Cuthbert and Insel, 2013). Variability
between individuals in different cognitive core processes may
underlie behavioral differences among healthy individuals
but also clinical symptoms beyond the normative range.
As cognitive neuroscience often includes analyses of inter-
subject variability in cognitive core processes (Bishop, 2009;
Indovina et al., 2011), it is well suited to study variation
in fundamental behavioral processes (Insel et al., 2010;
Cuthbert and Insel, 2013) related to specific psychiatric
symptoms.
Studies adopting a neurocognitive endophenotype approach
have often compared patients and healthy next-of-a-kin in
specific behaviors and underlying structure/processes that
are more present in these groups than in controls (Ersche
et al., 2010, 2012, 2013; Morein-Zamir et al., 2013). An
alternative approach is to directly study variability in the
general population. A fundamental question is then how
variation in the capacity to process information relates to
clinical symptoms. One hypothesis is that the capacity to
carry out cognitive core processes is inversely and directly
related to certain psychiatric symptoms. From an information-
processing viewpoint, cognitive core process capacities vary in
the population from extremely efficient to extremely inefficient,
depending on underlying genetic composition, learning history
and state variables. This variation is often normally distributed
(Figure 1A), e.g., in executive functions (Zelazo et al., 2013).
Since cognitive processes form and shape individual behaviors,
suboptimal cognitive core capacity can translate into behavioral
symptoms. The frequency and intensity of these symptoms will
be continuously distributed in the general population—with
most below the threshold for clinical significance (Figure 1B).
However, increasingly severe symptoms impair functioning,
making it difficult for the affected individual to uphold expected
social relations, or be occupationally productive. Such loss of
functioning is the sine qua non of psychiatric disorders. To
the extent that psychiatric disorders constitute extremes in
variation across the population caused by suboptimal cognitive
core process function, dimensional approaches will be a
better fit than categorical ones. This has been suggested for
several disorders such as ADHD (Figure 1C; Das et al.,
2012).
“COOL” EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS AND
ADHD
Applying the model described above on dimensional approaches
of psychopathology suggests that the worse cognitive capacity
an individual possesses, the more symptoms he or she should
manifest. Empirically, the general dimensional model seems
to hold particularly well for ADHD. For example, in a non-
clinical sample of more than 2000 adults, ADHD symptoms were
normally distributed (Das et al., 2012). The dimensionality of
ADHD symptoms has also been repeatedly observed in patient
samples (Levy et al., 1997; Salum et al., 2014). Early models
of ADHD posited that ADHD is a disorder of dysfunctional
executive functions (e.g., Barkley, 1997). In line with these
ideas, ADHD patients as a group tend to perform below
average in laboratory tests of executive function capacity
(Willcutt et al., 2005). While there is evidence suggesting
a dimensionality for both ADHD symptoms and executive
function capacity, associating trait-like capacities for executive
functions to ADHD symptoms in the general population is
not trivial. Namely, test performance can vary across and
within individuals as a function of numerous factors including
alertness/arousal, motivation, and past experience/exposure.
Other clinical conditions such as traumatic brain injury or
periodic psychiatric problems (e.g., mood disorders) also
may affect executive function performance. Correspondingly,
numerous traits may be related to ADHD, only some of which
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FIGURE 1 | Distribution of processing capacities and symptoms in the
general population. (A) A model that suggests that different cognitive core
capacities in the population often follows a normal distribution. Extremely low
cognitive core capacities will induce a functional loss. Such a distribution is for
example observed for executive function capacity. (B) The model posits that
this capacity is mirrored in different behavioral symptoms, and that the
transition from sub-clinical to clinical symptoms is defined by functional loss.
(C) ADHD symptoms in the general population follows such a distribution.
Panel C is originally from Das et al. (2012) and reprinted with permission from
PLos One.
are related to dysfunctional executive functions (Castellanos
and Proal, 2012). Finally, different individuals may rate the
same behavior differently depending on cultural factors and
meta-cognitive capacity. Still, a community study of more than
16,000 children and adolescents provides some support for
the dimensionality of ADHD symptoms and their relationship
to putative executive function capacity (Crosbie et al., 2013).
Specifically, the study reproduced, in a general pediatric
population, the normal distribution of ADHD-symptoms (Das
et al., 2012). Moreover, rated attentional problems in daily
life correlated with putative executive function capacity on
the stop signal test. The stop signal test measures capacity
to suppress an initiated movement and is frequently used
for measuring executive functions in ADHD (Nichols and
Waschbusch, 2004; Alderson et al., 2007). The relationship
between real life problems and stop signal performance was
linear across the entire distribution rather than limited to the
children who had been diagnosed with ADHD. Thus, there is
evidence that both ADHD symptoms and executive function
capacity are normally distributed in the population, and that
they are associated with each other. On a more general level
this suggests that there is a relation between the capacity of
specific cognitive core processes and symptom severity in the
population extending from healthy individuals to those with
frank psychiatric states.
Neuroatonomy of “Cool” Executive
Functions
Since executive functions and ADHD symptoms appear to
be linked, understanding the underlying neural mechanisms
mediating the cognitive processes should help elucidate how
related clinical symptoms emerge. Executive functions may be
defined as a set of control mechanisms that regulate non-routine
information processing including behavioral suppression, task
switching, adaption, or change of strategy (Barkley, 2012;
Goldstein and Naglieri, 2014). To distinguish classical executive
functions from those related to emotional processes, the former
have been termed ‘‘cool’’ executive functions. These functions
are dependent on the prefrontal cortex (PFC) although they
represent distributed network processes encompassing many
different brain regions including the basal ganglia (BG) and
brainstem neuromodulatory systems. The circuits subserving
executive functions also involve thalamus, parietal cortex and
cerebellum.However, for simplicity, we abbreviate these complex
circuits by referring primarily to the prefrontal and anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC). In part resulting from Barkley’s
(1997) suggestion of the primacy of inhibitory capacity in
ADHD, many investigators have examined performance on
the stop-signal test (Crosbie et al., 2013) and the Stroop test
(Lansbergen et al., 2007), both of which involve inhibitory
aspects.
The Stroop test targets the involvement of executive
functions in resolution of a cognitive conflict mediated by an
incongruent stimulus (see Figure 2). This test of executive
functions is especially interesting for the model presented
here because it can also be used in the emotional domain
(Egner et al., 2008; Eippert et al., 2009). A seminal article
(Kerns et al., 2004) used the Stroop task to decompose
different neuronal aspects of executive functions. This study
leveraged the conflict resolution that occurs when the same
cognitive conflict condition is repeated (see Figure 2A). By
presenting two incongruent stimuli in a row, Kerns et al.
(2004) differentiated two separate conditions for the same
type of incongruent stimulus: (1) when conflict was high
and conflict resolution was low (first incongruent stimulus);
and (2) when conflict resolution was high and conflict was
low (second incongruent stimulus). The first type of stimulus
presentation evoked an error signal that could activate prefrontal
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FIGURE 2 | The Stroop task—as an example of “cool” executive function tasks. (A) In the Stroop task colored words are presented where the word itself
represents a color. The task is to indicate the color of the word but ignore the word meaning. In some conditions both the color and the word are associated with the
same color (congruent condition), while in other conditions the color and the word are associated with different colors (incongruent condition). In the incongruent
condition there is a conflict between processes associated with color identification/naming and reading. In order to solve the task, this cognitive conflict has to be
regulated using top-down control by suppressing the conflicting process and strengthening the processes associated with the correct response. If two incongruent
stimuli are presented in a row, the conflict and error signal is somewhat smaller in the second incongruent condition as conflict-resolution (i.e., adjustment) has been
engaged (Kerns et al., 2004). (B) Behaviorally, response times mirror the cognitive conflict (red vs. blue) and its resolution (smaller response time in the second
incongruent condition vs. the first incongruent condition—both in red). (C) These different conditions are mirrored in the underlying brain activations of caudal anterior
cingulate cortex (cACC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) representing conflict, error and adjustment. Panels B,C are originally from Kerns et al. (2004) and
reprinted with permission from AAAS.
conflict resolution systems and decrease conflict in the next
stimulus presentation. These manipulations were reflected
behaviorally in terms of magnitude of response-time cost of
incongruency and in neural signals. Specifically, activation in
caudal anterior cingulate cortex (cACC), observed in the first
incongruent stimuli condition, was associated with conflict
and error-signals (see Figure 2C; Kerns et al., 2004) or
with initially resolving the conflict (Roelofs et al., 2006;
Aarts et al., 2008). Subsequent activation of dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), observed in the second incongruent
stimulus condition, was interpreted as reflecting updating
the rules used to more effectively solve the conflict (see
Figure 2C).
Meta-analyses suggest that similar regions including cACC
and dlPFC are also involved in other executive function tasks
including spatial interference, stop-signal task, go/no-go task,
flanker task and Simon task (Nee et al., 2007; Cieslik et al.,
2015). Apart from those regions, parietal cortex is also critically
involved in executive function tasks as a part of frontoparietal
executive control networks. Interestingly, both ventrolateral PFC
(vlPFC) and anterior insula are involved in such executive
function tasks (Nee et al., 2007; Whelan et al., 2012; Cieslik et al.,
2015)—although they often are assigned to emotional processing
systems.
Neuroanatomy of “Cool” Executive
Functions in ADHD
Dysfunctional executive functions observed in ADHD patients
should be mirrored in the underlying structure and function
of systems mediating this regulation (Castellanos et al., 2006;
Bush, 2010). In line with this idea, maturation of the thickness
of the cortex, which follows a normative inverted-U trajectory,
was found to be significantly delayed in children with ADHD
across nearly the entire cortex, with greatest delays in PFC and
ACC (Shaw et al., 2007). In a naturalistic comparison, adolescents
taking psychostimulants differed in the rate of change of cortical
thickness from those not taking psychostimulants (Shaw et al.,
2009), suggesting that medication might ameliorate the delayed
development. Thinning in the medial and dlPFC was persistent
only in those patients that maintained the full ADHD diagnosis
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FIGURE 3 | Altered networks in ADHD associated with “cool” executive functions. (A) Some studies have suggested a smaller gray matter volume in cACC
and dlPFC (e.g., Seidman et al., 2011), and (B) diminished activations in these networks during executive function tasks in patients with ADHD compared to controls
(Dickstein et al., 2006). Panel A is originally from Seidman et al. (2011) and reprinted with permission from Elsevier. Panel B is originally from Dickstein et al. (2006)
and reprinted with permission from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
in adulthood (Shaw et al., 2013). An earlier and smaller study
found that adult patients with ADHD displayed decreased
smaller gray matter volumes in both cACC and dlPFC, although
the findings weremodest and did not survive full brain correction
(Seidman et al., 2011; Figure 3A).
Similarly, activation of these networks is altered during
top-down regulatory tasks in ADHD-patients. Meta-analysis
of functional imaging studies reveals decreased activation in
patients with ADHD in systems involved in executive functions
(e.g., the frontoparietal networks) and attention (e.g., ventral
attentional network) in task-based studies (Cortese et al., 2012).
When studies were restricted to inhibition or attention tasks,
ADHD patients showed reduced activation in similar networks
(Dickstein et al., 2006; Hart et al., 2013; Figure 3B). While the
deficit in inhibition activation was more prominent in right
inferior frontal cortex, supplementary motor area (SMA) and
ACC, the deficit in attention-activation was more prominent
in dlPFC, parietal and cerebellar areas (Hart et al., 2013).
Specifically in the Stroop task, dlPFC was less activated for
sustained attentional control and the cACC less activated for
transient aspects of attentional control (i.e., incongruent trials
vs. neutral trials in the incongruent block) in young adults with
ADHD vs. controls (Banich et al., 2009).
“HOT” EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS,
EMOTIONAL PROCESSING, AND
EMOTIONAL INSTABILITY
Can Emotional Processes be Isolated?
Information processing in the brain is dependent on complex
reciprocal interactions between multiple regions in large-scale
networks (Mesulam, 1998, 2012; Engel et al., 2001; Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011; Siegel et al., 2012). It has therefore been
debated whether brain processes associated with ‘‘emotion’’ can
be separated from those associated with ‘‘cognition’’ (Pessoa,
2008; Okon-Singer et al., 2015). This question may be rephrased
in terms of whether it is possible to separate ‘‘emotional’’
from ‘‘non-emotional’’ processes (and associated regulatory
mechanisms), since cognition comprises both emotional and
non-emotional information. For example, attention, working-
memory and executive-control are not either emotional or
non-emotional processes as they operate on both types
of information. This point has previously been made for
theoretical constructs of attention in distinguishing ‘‘cool’’
executive functions regulating non-emotional processes and
‘‘hot’’ executive functions regulating emotional processes (Zelazo
and Mueller, 2002; Kerr and Zelazo, 2004; Castellanos et al.,
2006; Rubia, 2011). Therefore, the focus is instead on the possible
distinction between emotional processes and non-emotional
processes. Clearly, both processes influence each other (Pessoa,
2008; Okon-Singer et al., 2015). In the same vein, any emotional
regulatory task will contain non-emotional processes such as
holding instructions on line in a working-memory buffer and
associated attentional processes.
Nevertheless, the distinction between emotional regulatory
systems and non-emotional regulatory systems is useful
since there are clinical states in which dysfunction of one
pole or the other predominates. Dysregulation is more
related to non-emotional processes in classical ADHD
while it is more associated with emotional processes in
various clinical disorders of emotional instability such as
BPD, ASPD or CD. These clinical entities suggest that
although emotional and non-emotional processes are both
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overlapping and interwoven (Pessoa, 2008; Okon-Singer
et al., 2015), certain aspects of the involved networks may be
more related to emotional or non-emotional dysregulation,
respectively. Therefore, to understand the specificity of
these disorders, components that are more associated with
emotional regulation and non-emotional regulation need to be
identified.
Large numbers of emotional regulatory processes have been
described (Hartley and Phelps, 2010; Gyurak et al., 2011; Ochsner
et al., 2012). While some directly modulate an emotional
experience (Ochsner et al., 2012), others are subtler and regulate
emotional processes to accomplish a cognitive task (Gyurak
et al., 2011), i.e., ‘‘hot’’ executive functions, or are involved
in extinction (Schiller and Delgado, 2010; Milad and Quirk,
2012).While processes that regulate emotions are often voluntary
and therefore explicit, attentional processes are often automatic
and implicit. Here we focus on two fundamental types of
emotional regulatory processes that represent different types
of top-down control: implicit attentional and explicit cognitive
reappraisal processes (Gyurak et al., 2011; Ochsner et al.,
2012).
Implicit Attentional Control of Emotional
Processes
The attentional dimension in voluntary regulation of emotional
experiences has been extensively discussed (Ochsner et al.,
2012). However, for the present purpose automatic implicit
attentional mechanisms in strictly defined executive function
tasks (Gyurak et al., 2011) may be even more interesting
since they have the potential to separate emotional from non-
emotional components.
Building on the model of decomposing sub-components of
executive functions in the Stroop task (Kerns et al., 2004),
Etkin et al. (2006) constructed an emotional Stroop task in
which affective facial expressions were displayed with overlaid
congruent or incongruent words expressing affects (Figure 4).
The task was to report the facial affect and ignore the overlaid
words. This yielded both congruent stimuli (in which the facial
expression and the word corresponded to the same emotion) and
incongruent stimuli incorporating a conflicting process (in which
the affective facial expression and emotion word differed). As in
the non-emotional version (Kerns et al., 2004), this task could
separate an incongruent stimulus in which conflict remained
high (first incongruent stimulus) from an incongruent stimulus
in which the conflict level was smaller due to conflict resolution
(second incongruent stimulus). There was a reaction time
increase for the incongruent condition as compared with the
congruent condition, indicating that a conflict was successfully
induced. Importantly, this increase was smaller for the second
incongruent condition compared with the first incongruent
condition, indicating conflict resolution. On a neuronal level,
amygdala activation was observed in the high conflict condition
reflecting increased influence of the non-relevant emotional
incongruent stimuli. However, amygdala activity decreased and
activity in rostral ACC (rACC) increased in the low conflict
(repeated) incongruent condition. Path-analysis indicated that
rACC directly suppressed amygdala activity in this condition.
FIGURE 4 | Brain systems underlying the emotional Stroop task.
(A) The emotional Stroop task has similar features as the original Stroop task
including congruent stimuli (without conflict between different processes) and
incongruent stimuli (with a conflict between different processes)—but also
includes an emotional dimension that needs to be controlled. In the presented
example above faces were used from the karolinska directed emotional faces
(KDEF; Lundqvist et al., 1998). (B) Using a similar version of emotional Stroop
task Etkin et al. (2006) showed that higher conflicts increased amygdala
involvement and conflict resolution was associated with rostral anterior
cingulate cortex (rACC) activation and negative influence on amygdala activity.
Panel B is orginally from Etkin et al. (2006) and reprinted with permission from
Elsevier.
Thus, this study suggests that rACC influences amygdala
processing to solve an executive function task with emotional
content.
A potential confound in the above study was that non-
emotional regulation was not controlled for. Therefore,
regulatorymechanisms that were specific to emotional regulation
could not be differentiated from mechanisms that are shared
with non-emotional regulatory processes. A later study by
the same group (Egner et al., 2008) sought to distinguish
these two dimensions by presenting the same stimuli in two
different tasks, differing in emotional intensity. One task was
as described above, and the other involved labeling sex with
congruent or incongruent words (i.e., ‘‘male’’ or ‘‘female’’)
using the same set of pictures. The original findings were
reproduced and survived controlling for the non-emotional
regulatory processes. It may be argued that the control for
non-emotional regulation was not perfect since both tasks
contained affective facial expressions. However, this tradeoff
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is inevitable since using different types of stimuli in the non-
emotional condition would have confounded the task. In sum,
this study represents an innovative example of how to control
for non-emotional aspects of top-down regulation in automatic
attentional tasks.
Other studies on affective interferences in the Stroop test
and comparable tasks (Whalen et al., 1998; Ochsner et al.,
2009; Rahm et al., 2013) also support the conclusion that
similar attentional processes take place in the emotional
domain as in the non-emotional domain. The studies
converge in highlighting the rACC as specifically involved
in emotional executive function tasks, while the cACC is
specifically involved in related non-emotional executive function
tasks. These findings are consistent with the distinction
between ‘‘cool’’ and ‘‘hot’’ executive function processes
and their relative regional specificity (Zelazo and Mueller,
2002; Kerr and Zelazo, 2004; Castellanos et al., 2006; Rubia,
2011).
Explicit Regulation of Emotional Processes
Arguably, the cognitive reappraisal task is one of the most
frequently used experimental methods to study emotional
regulation (Ochsner et al., 2012; Buhle et al., 2014). Cognitive
reappraisal tasks differ substantially from Stroop tasks. While
Stroop tasks entail a mechanism that implicitly deals with
demanding and fast interference that needs to be resolved
on-line for the task to be performed, cognitive reappraisal
of emotional stimuli involves an explicit in-depth regulation
of information processing. In cognitive reappraisal of emotional
stimuli, the task is to change the emotional interpretation
of a stimulus. In this way it is more explicit and proactive
than Stroop tasks. A task can involve reinterpreting the
meaning of emotional pictures from negative to neutral or
positive valence. For example, the face of a crying woman,
which is automatically interpreted as an emotionally negative
picture, can be reinterpreted as a woman who is crying
from happiness over seeing her son again after a year. Thus,
instead of controlling distracting emotional processes (as in an
emotional Stroop task) the reappraisal task actually changes
the rules for the emotional interpretation of the world. It
requires active assignment of different emotional meaning to
stimuli.
The inherent problem of cognitive reappraisal tasks is the
difficulty of obtaining behavioral measures since these tasks
rely on subjective reports. Moreover, subjects have little insight
into what they do during the task. Nevertheless, this has been
a popular approach to study emotional regulation since it
can dramatically change how we experience the world and
it is theoretically close to various cognitive therapies. Cognitive
reappraisal tasks have been found to modulate the processing of
emotional stimuli in regions such as amygdala and the ventral
striatum (Buhle et al., 2014).
The emotional Stroop task regularly shows prefrontal
activations both in dlPFC and lateral orbitofrontal cortex
(lOFC)/vlPFC (Eippert et al., 2007; Wager et al., 2008; Kanske
et al., 2011; Golkar et al., 2012; Buhle et al., 2014), although other
regions (including the dorsal ACC and the dorsomedial PFC)
seem to support other components of the task (Ochsner et al.,
2012). It has been suggested that dlPFC is involved in general
selective attention and working memory, while the lOFC/vlPFC
seems to be important for selecting a goal-appropriate reappraisal
(Ochsner et al., 2012). Thus, theoretically the lOFC/vlPFC
should be more specifically involved in emotional regulatory
components of the task. In a few studies, attempts have been
made to tease apart these components (Wager et al., 2008;
Golkar et al., 2012). In one of the studies (Wager et al., 2008),
when the rated success of emotional regulation was regressed
on the cognitive reappraisal of emotion contrast, the dlPFC
contribution was smaller and that of the lOFC/vlPFC larger
than in the standard subtraction analysis (Figure 5). Thus
a measurement better reflecting actual emotional regulation
was more tightly coupled to lOFC/vlPFC than dlPFC. In
another study (Golkar et al., 2012), a neutral control state was
introduced which contained non-emotional aspects of the task,
and the interaction revealed more specific activation also in
the lOFC/vlPFC. Both these studies are examples that suggest
that it is possible to partially separate emotional from non-
emotional components in the cognitive re-appraisal task and
FIGURE 5 | Brain systems underlying cognitive re-appraisal. In cognitive reappraisal studies, typically an emotional picture is presented and the subjects are
given a task to explicitly down- or up-regulate the emotional content. In conditions where unpleasant pictures are re-interpreted as more positive, amygdala activity is
down-regulated and a network of regions is activated including lateral orbitofrontal cortex (lOFC). lOFC activity correlates closely with re-appraisal success during
cognitive re-appraisal (Wager et al., 2008). Figure is originally from Wager et al. (2008) and reprinted with permission from Elsevier.
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that indicate greater involvement of the lOFC/vlPFC in the
emotional component. Thus, as for rACC there seems to be
specificity for lOFC in emotional regulation. This also suggests
a possible role for this region in disorders involving emotional
dysregulation.
A Role for rACC in Regulation of Emotion
and Pain
Previously we have suggested the importance of rACC in implicit
attentional regulation in the emotional domain (such as ‘‘hot’’
executive functions). However, a range of other studies suggests
a general role for the ACC in emotional regulation. Importantly,
although the rACC and cACC differ in their involvement in
attentional tasks—as has long been suggested (Bush et al.,
2000)—there is little support for a general division between an
emotional and a non-emotional cingulate (Etkin et al., 2011;
Okon-Singer et al., 2015). In fact, some parts of cACC are
highly involved in emotional processes that include negative
valence such as pain unpleasantness (Vogt et al., 1993), social
exclusion (Eisenberger, 2012) and fear potentiation and appraisal
(Etkin et al., 2011; Milad and Quirk, 2012). The cACC is also
implicated in behaviors associated with emotional or painful
situations and has been viewed as an emotional motor output
region (Craig, 2009; Perini et al., 2013). Other influential theories
suggest that this part of the cACC has a common role of linking
reinforcers to motor centers responsible for expressing negative
affect and executing goal-directed behaviors (Shackman et al.,
2011) and thereby performing similar fundamental processes
for both pain and attention. However, the anatomical and
functional relation between ACC involvement in processing of
pain/emotion and non-emotional attentional processes is yet to
be established.
Studies on placebo analgesia (Petrovic et al., 2002; Wager
et al., 2004, 2007; Zubieta et al., 2005; Bingel et al., 2006; Eippert
et al., 2009; Wager and Atlas, 2015) and emotional placebo
(Petrovic et al., 2005; Ellingsen et al., 2013) have also suggested
the rACC is involved in top-down regulation of pain and
emotion (see Figure 6A). Importantly, this activation remained
when controlling for non-emotional attentional aspects of
treatment either through interaction or correlation analyses
(Petrovic et al., 2002, 2005). The high concentration of opioid
receptors expressed in rACC (Vogt et al., 1993; Fields, 2004)
has been hypothesized to relate to attentional mechanisms that
can suppress pain processing (Petrovic et al., 2002), a suggestion
that has received experimental support (Zubieta et al., 2005;
Wager et al., 2007; Eippert et al., 2009). In more general
terms, specific neuromodulatory systems in the rACC have
been suggested to be involved in conflict resolution in the
pain or emotion domains when expectations do not match
processing of sensory input (Petrovic et al., 2002). The known
anatomical connectivity between opioid systems in rACC and
the periaqueductal gray (PAG; Vogt et al., 1993) in turn
suggests that such modulation acts through regulating opioid
systems in the PAG (Petrovic et al., 2002). This was suggested
by functional connectivity between rACC and PAG that was
opioid and placebo specific (Petrovic et al., 2002) as well as opioid
dependent (Eippert et al., 2009; see Figures 6B,C). More specific
opioid connectivity between these structures was also shown
(Wager et al., 2007). Apart from the PAG, other regions such as
amygdala and ventral striatum are likely involved in the placebo
effect and may be directly controlled by the rACC (Petrovic et al.,
2005; Zubieta et al., 2005; Bingel et al., 2006; Wager et al., 2007;
Scott et al., 2008; Eippert et al., 2009; Ellingsen et al., 2013).
Thus, studies of the placebo effect suggest that rACC is in a
position to regulate emotion and pain processes using specific
underlying neuromodulatory systems such as the opioid system.
Other neuromodulatory systems may also be involved although
this is still unknown. Note that more caudal parts of the ACC
process pain per se (Petrovic et al., 2002), in line with the idea that
cACC is involved in processing the unpleasant aspects of pain
(Vogt et al., 1993).
A closely related domain of research on conditioning
and extinction in both rodents and humans also suggests
that ventromedial PFC (vmPFC), an area neighboring rACC,
supports extinction while cACC supports increased aversive
processing (Milad and Quirk, 2012; see Figure 7). The vmPFC
is thought to modulate amygdala processing of conditioned
fear by suppressing fear responses through a set of amygdala
neurons in the intercalated region between the basolateral and
central amygdala nucleus (Milad and Quirk, 2012). Different
strategies to modify conditioned fear, i.e., extinction, reversal
and voluntary regulation of fear, have been shown to activate
similar regions in vmPFC/rACC (Schiller and Delgado, 2010).
In other words, this line of research mimics placebo research in
assigning similar regions in the brain an emotional regulatory
function on emotional processes in subcortical regions such as
amygdala.
Another line of research has suggested that rACC and the
neighboring vmPFC are important in processing the subjective
value of rewards (Kable and Glimcher, 2007), which may also
be associated with opioid activation (Petrovic et al., 2008). In the
neuroeconomics literature, overlapping activity often centered
on neighboring vmPFC is thought to integrate anticipated values
and costs (from regions such as ventral striatum and amygdala)
associated with the different options being converted into a single
quantity to guide behavior (Ruff and Fehr, 2014).
In summary, converging lines of evidence (including research
on emotional executive functions, placebo research and research
on extinction of conditioned fear) suggest that rACC and
neighboring vmPFC are specifically involved in emotional
regulation of lower-level structures including amygdala, PAG
and ventral striatum. This effect seems to be specific for
emotion/pain processes and supports the idea of a system
sub-specialized for ‘‘hot’’ executive functions and emotional
regulation.
A Role for OFC in Regulation of Emotion
and Pain
Above we have suggested that OFC has an important role in
explicit emotional regulation such as cognitive re-appraisal, in
which subjects are asked to modulate the emotions associated
with a picture (see above). How does this relate to the
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FIGURE 6 | Brain systems underlying the placebo effect. (A) Meta-analysis indicating brain networks showing suppressed activity (blue) and increased activity
(yellow/orange) related to placebo analgesia (PPL; Atlas and Wager, 2014). Regions showing increased activity include ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)/rACC
and lOFC. Note that caudal ACC (cACC) decreases in activity after placebo treatment in association with decreased pain unpleasantness. (B) Studies also show that
PPL involves opioid dependent interactions between rACC and the brainstem. For example, functional connectivity between rACC (blue dot) and the brainstem was
observed in opioid analgesia (POP) and in PPL but not in untreated pain (P; Petrovic et al., 2002). (C) This connectivity has been shown to be opioid dependent
(Eippert et al., 2009). Panel A is originally from Atlas and Wager (2014) and reprinted with permission from Springer. Panel B is originally from Petrovic et al. (2002)
and reprinted with permission from AAAS. Panel C is originally from Eippert et al. (2009) and reprinted with permission from Elsevier.
general function of OFC? The OFC comprises a complex
set of regions that may be differentiated along medial-lateral
and anterior-posterior gradients (Ongur and Price, 2000;
Ongur et al., 2003; Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004; Kringelbach,
2005). Although the OFC receives input from many sensory
modalities and may be the most polymodal region in the cortex
(Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004), it is notable that many OFC
inputs are interoceptive. Thus, the interoceptive needs of the
subject are mapped in OFC where they may interact with
reward signals and reinforcers from the exteroceptive world.
While more primitive unimodal signals seem to be processed
posteriorly, more abstract multimodal signals and reinforcers
seem to be processed anteriorly (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004).
A lateral orbital network receives inputs from different sensory
modalities and a medial network includes regions in ACC and
ventro/dorsomedial prefrontal systems and has been suggested
to be an important cortical output for visceromotor structures
(Ongur and Price, 2000). The medial-lateral distinction has
also been observed in human functional imaging of reward
processing in which positive feedback and value are mapped
to medial OFC while negative feedback is mapped to lOFC
(O’Doherty et al., 2001). These results are in line with findings
that lOFC represents aversive error-signals (Seymour et al.,
2005).
Recent models of a general OFC function emphasize
involvement in constructing expected values based on
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FIGURE 7 | Brain systems underlying fear conditioning. In fear conditioning, vmPFC in humans and infralimbic regions (IL) in rodents is associated with
suppressed conditioned fear while cACC (dACC here) in humans and prelimbic regions (PL) in rodents is associated with increased conditioned fear through
modulation of amygdala (Milad and Quirk, 2012). Figure is originally published by Milad and Quirk (2012) and reprinted with permission from Annual Reviews.
multimodal inputs (including current internal states) that
drive behavior (Schoenbaum and Roesch, 2005; Murray et al.,
2007; Schoenbaum et al., 2009; Rudebeck and Murray, 2014). In
functional imaging, the association between OFC and complex
expected values is illustrated in selective reward devaluation
(Small et al., 2001; Gottfried et al., 2003; Kringelbach et al.,
2003) and context dependent processing of subjective values (de
Araujo et al., 2005; Plassmann et al., 2008).
While the studies above suggest that subjective experience
of stimuli may be driven by expectation systems, this has
been a principal focus in research on the placebo effect.
The lOFC has been activated in several placebo treatment
studies (often in co-activation with rACC) as indicated by
meta-analysis (Atlas and Wager, 2014; Wager and Atlas, 2015;
Figure 6A) including placebo analgesia (Petrovic et al., 2002;
Lieberman et al., 2004; Wager et al., 2004) and emotional
placebo (Petrovic et al., 2005). Interestingly, the lOFC was
specifically activated during placebo analgesia but not during
opioid-induced analgesia (Petrovic et al., 2002, 2010) suggesting
that some cognitive mechanisms are important for the placebo
effect but not for opioid-mediated analgesia. Activation in
lOFC is believed to represent treatment expectation and the
related error-signal between treatment expectation and incoming
nociceptive signal (Petrovic et al., 2010) in line with the idea
that predictions about different outcomes drive the placebo
response (Buchel et al., 2014). Such expectation related processes
in the lOFC have been suggested to drive pain and emotion
regulatory signals in rACC and are in line with placebo-specific
functional connectivity between these regions (Petrovic et al.,
2010).
The involvement of lOFC in cognitive reappraisal and
placebo can be understood in light of theoretical models
of OFC function (Schoenbaum and Roesch, 2005; Murray
et al., 2007; Schoenbaum et al., 2009; Rudebeck and Murray,
2014). In cognitive reappraisal, subjects are instructed to
shift their expectation about emotional stimuli, which
resembles the expectation manipulation performed in
response to placebo. The change of expectations in both
paradigms involves assigning new values to emotional stimuli
by OFC.
“Hot” Executive Functions and Emotional
Regulation in Emotional Instability
The need for understanding the specific processes underlying
emotional regulation is driven by the clinical symptoms
often observed in emotional instability disorders such as
BPD, ASPD and CD. Although all these disorders have
a high rate of comorbidity with ADHD and with ADHD
symptoms, they are unquestionably different from classical
DSM-5 ADHD. Symptoms involving frequent variability in
experiencing intense emotional states and emotion related
behaviors are fundamental to emotional instability disorders
but not a necessary component of classic ADHD. A central
question is therefore whether networks that are more specifically
involved in emotional regulation also are more specifically
dysfunctional in these disorders. Given the specific involvement
of rACC and lOFC in emotional regulation (as outlined above)
it may be questioned whether these regions also differ in
structure and function in conditions characterized by emotional
instability.
Several studies of brain morphometry have been conducted
in emotional instability disorders including BPD, ASPD and
CD. Although, they represent initial steps in understanding
the underlying pathophysiology, there are two major problems
with many of these studies. The first is that most studies
have been underpowered, with few patients and controls. The
second is that ADHD has not been considered. Nevertheless,
two relatively well-powered volumetric studies of BPD (Soloff
et al., 2008, 2012) found smaller gray matter volume in
rACC and lOFC (Figures 8A,B). Smaller lOFC volume was
specifically observed in suicide attempters and even more
so in high lethality suicide attempters (Soloff et al., 2012).
Similar structural abnormalities have also been observed in
other emotional instability disorders such as ASPD (Yang
and Raine, 2009). However, such findings have not regularly
been observed in morphometric studies of ADHD—in fact
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FIGURE 8 | Altered networks in borderline personality disorder (BPD) associated with “hot” executive functions and emotional regulation.
(A,B) Previous research has suggested smaller gray matter volume in rACC and lOFC in patients with BPD (Soloff et al., 2008, 2012). (C) Attenuated activity has
been observed in rACC during emotional Stroop (Wingenfeld et al., 2009) in BPD as compared to controls. (D) Moreover, lower lOFC activity has been observed
during cognitive re-appraisal in BPD as compared to controls (Schulze et al., 2011). Panel A is originally from Soloff et al. (2008) and reprinted with permission from
Elsevier. Panel B is originally from Soloff et al. (2012) and reprinted with permission from Elsevier. Panel C is originally from Wingenfeld et al. (2009) and reprinted with
permission from Elsevier. Panel D is originally from Schulze et al. (2011) and reprinted with permission from Elsevier.
the opposite has been observed (Seidman et al., 2011)—as
discussed below. The volume of other regions suggested
to be involved in emotional processing in BPD, such as
amygdala and insula, was also smaller (Soloff et al., 2008,
2012).
Although structural findings can be suggestive, ultimately,
the functionality of regions such as rACC and lOFC in
tasks involving emotional regulation must be addressed to
better understand emotional instability. Few studies have been
published so far that directly test ‘‘hot’’ executive functions
and emotional regulation in emotional instability disorders.
However, some studies suggest a lower activation of regulatory
networks in such disorders. Using a verbal emotional Stroop
task, Wingenfeld et al. (2009) observed that BPD patients had
overall slower reaction times compared to healthy controls but
no increased slowing with emotional interference. However,
the BPD patients were not able to recruit rACC when they
needed to control for negative words (see Figure 8C). Another
recent study showed that BPD patients that dissociated were
more prone to show greater emotional interference (Winter
et al., 2015), although no differences were observed in rACC
using a verbal emotional Stroop task. One reason may be that
the interference in the verbal emotional Stroop task that was
used was too weak, as the controls showed neither a behavioral
interference effect nor any rACC activity. By contrast, this was
readily observed in Stroop tasks using affective faces (Etkin
et al., 2006; Egner et al., 2008). Several other studies using tasks
involving emotional conflict control have also shown deficient
activations of the subgenual ACC and rACC in patients with
BPD (Silbersweig et al., 2007; Enzi et al., 2013; Holtmann et al.,
2013; Jacob et al., 2013). Interestingly, in most studies involving
patients with BPD in which an emotional conflict must be
suppressed, increased activity in amygdala or insula (compared
with controls) has been observed, indicating unresolved or
heightened emotional conflict (Silbersweig et al., 2007; Krause-
Utz et al., 2012; Holtmann et al., 2013; Jacob et al., 2013;
Prehn et al., 2013)—but see Smoski et al. (2011). In line with
these findings a behavioral study has shown that patients with
CD have an impaired Stroop performance under distressing
emotional stimulation but no difference under neutral emotional
stimulation as compared to controls (Euler et al., 2014). Thus
this generalizes the above findings for other emotional instability
disorders.
Testing more complex emotional regulation targeting the
OFC with cognitive reappraisal of emotional pictures, BPD
patients have been found to activate lOFC to a lesser extent
than controls while they activated amygdala and insula more
(Schulze et al., 2011; Figure 8D). A study of cognitive reappraisal
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of a script-driven emotional induction did not show differences
in lOFC but found lower activations in rACC during up- and
down-regulation in BPD subjects compared to controls (Lang
et al., 2012).
Although the studies above have not corrected for non-
emotional ADHD symptoms nor isolated emotion-specific
components in the emotional Stroop-task or during cognitive
reappraisal, they indicate that rACC and lOFC appear to be
activated to a lesser degree during ‘‘hot’’ executive functions
and complex emotional regulation, and are structurally
smaller in BPD, the paradigmatic emotional instability
disorder.
Emotional ADHD and “Hot” Executive
Functions
ADHD as defined since DSM-III has considered emotional
dysregulation an associated feature, rather than a core
component. Instead, ADHD has been considered by many
to be synonymous with a disorder of executive function.
However, as mentioned previously, laboratory measures of
executive function are only moderately correlated with ADHD
symptoms and they correspond poorly to measures of real
world impairment. Interestingly, the effects of stimulant
medications impact laboratory measures of executive function
less than rated symptoms (Coghill et al., 2014b; Baroni
and Castellanos, 2015). Rather, the main effects seem to
be on subjective factors such as motivation. Along these
lines, phenomenological studies increasingly point to the
profoundly impairing effects of emotional dysregulation
among many adolescents and adults with ADHD (Castellanos
et al., 2006; Thorell, 2007; Yu et al., 2015). In line with this
reasoning, including tests on delay aversion and temporal
discounting along with standard executive function tests
reveals abnormalities in a large majority of ADHD patients
(Castellanos et al., 2006; Thorell, 2007; Yu et al., 2015).
These tests show that many subjects with ADHD more
often chose a smaller reward immediately than a larger
reward later in time as compared to controls. Thus, they
indicate that altered reward processing and behavior is
another important aspect of ADHD rather than only
dysfunctional executive functions. These observations have
formed the basis for the notion that the neurobiology
of ADHD entails at least two pathways, one related to
motivation, emotion and reward, and the other focused on
dysregulation of action and thought resulting from poor
inhibitory control (Sonuga-Barke, 2002; Thorell, 2007; Coghill
et al., 2014a).
Few functional imaging studies have addressed the difference
between ‘‘non-emotional’’ and ‘‘emotional’’ ADHD traits.
However, we note that one study observed that the strength
of functional connectivity (magnitude of correlation in
spontaneous activity) between amygdala and rACC and
between amygdala and posterior insula were significantly
correlated with parent ratings of emotional dysregulation in
children with ADHD (Hulvershorn et al., 2014)—suggesting
that emotional traits in ADHD may influence information
processing. Studies of this type are beginning to link
emotional dysregulation and brain circuits in the context of
ADHD.
THE RELATION BETWEEN EMOTIONAL
AND NON-EMOTIONAL REGULATORY
SYSTEMS
In summary, clinical dysfunctions of top-down regulatory
networks can be associated to non-emotional control such as
in classic DSM-5 ADHD or to emotional control such as
in BPD. We propose that this distinction is tenable because
certain regulatory components are more linked to one of
the two dimensions although emotional and non-emotional
processes highly overlap in the brain. As the cognitive core
process capacity of these regulatory systems varies in the
population, symptoms associated with both non-emotional
dysregulation and emotional dysregulation can be found along
a continuum—often normally distributed. This suggests that
some clinical states could therefore better be described as
extremes on this continuum than as categorically defined
disorders.
One important question that arises in this comparison
is how dysregulation of emotional processes relates to
dysregulation of non-emotional processes. It could be argued
that the underlying systems are completely independent,
and therefore separate in function and dysfunction. In this
case there should not be any increased comorbidity between
related clinical disorders (as compared to other disorders)
nor an increased risk to have dysregulation in another
dimension as compared to healthy subjects. However, this
is not the case. The comorbidity between ADHD and the
different emotional instability disorders is remarkably large.
For example, 42% comorbidity between ADHD and BPD
was reported in adolescence and 16% in adulthood in a
BPD sample (Philipsen et al., 2008) while the prevalence
of BPD in a cohort of 81 patients with ADHD was 37%
(Anckarsater et al., 2006). Up to 65% of men with ASPD were
reported to present comorbid ADHD (Semiz et al., 2008).
Comorbidity among ADHD and CD is substantial (Rubia,
2011). The clinical state of emotional ADHD (Castellanos
et al., 2006) also suggests a link between non-emotional and
emotional dysregulation. Moreover, ADHD is genetically
related to emotional instability disorders such as BPD (Distel
et al., 2011). Therefore, the emerging picture suggests both
common overlapping mechanisms and specific non-overlapping
mechanisms.
However, although research suggests a strong association
between non-emotional and emotional regulation, recent brain
imaging results suggest that the relation is complex. In a
reasonably large study on ADHD that specifically excluded
patients with affective problems (Seidman et al., 2011) somewhat
smaller gray matter volumes were found in dlPFC and cACC as
predicted. An exploratory analysis also found tentative evidence
of larger gray matter volumes bilaterally in lOFC and rACC in
the ADHD group than in the healthy controls (Figure 9A). By
contrast, well-powered studies of BPD (Soloff et al., 2008, 2012)
showed smaller gray matter volumes in rACC and lOFC. Thus,
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FIGURE 9 | Relation between networks mediating emotional and
non-emotional top-down regulation. (A) Patients with ADHD without
emotional dysregulation disorders showed larger gray matter volume in lOFC
and rACC compared with controls (Seidman et al., 2011). (B) Variability
observed when healthy subjects rate sub-clinical symptoms associated with
non-emotional attentional dysregulation and emotional dysregulation (Petrovic
et al., 2015) using the Brown Attention-Deficit Disorder Scales (Brown, 1996).
(C) Gray matter volume in lOFC was negatively correlated with symptoms
related to emotional dysregulation but positively correlated with symptoms
related to non-emotional attentional dysregulation (Petrovic et al., 2015). Panel
A is originally from Seidman et al. (2011) and reprinted with permission from
Elsevier. Panels B,C are originally from Petrovic et al. (2015) and reprinted with
permission from Oxford University Press.
the opposite picture emerges for gray matter volume in these
regions in classical ADHD (where the affective component is
small) compared to BPD.
These results were partially replicated in a recent study on
emotional dysregulation in 87 healthy subjects (Petrovic et al.,
2015; see Figures 9B,C). In this study, symptoms related to
emotional dysregulation correlated negatively with gray matter
volume in lOFC bilaterally, while symptoms related to non-
emotional attentional dysregulation (i.e., classical ADHD-like
symptoms) were positively correlated with gray matter volume
in the same region. Thus, it seems that although emotional
and non-emotional dysregulation are positively correlated, these
dimensions can be inversely related to brain volume in regions
that are more involved in non-emotional regulation (such as
dlPFC and cACC) and regions that are more involved in
emotional regulation (such as lOFC and rACC).
What underlies this puzzling relation between the two
regulatory systems is not known. However, these top-down
modulatory regions have shown opposite activations during
specific attentional tasks (Simpson et al., 2000; Dolcos and
McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2011)—suggesting mutual active
suppression. Moreover, some of these regions such as rACC
and cACC tend to correspond to distinct resting state networks
that can exhibit anticorrelations during resting state scans
(Fox et al., 2005; Fransson, 2005). Although such negative
correlations cannot be interpreted as implyingmutual inhibition,
these robust anti-phase patterns do suggest interactions between
emotional and non-emotional regulatory systems in general. We
speculate that dysfunction in one regulatory system (e.g., ‘‘non-
emotional’’) could promote the other regulatory system (e.g.,
‘‘emotional’’) to develop and compensate for the dysfunctional
system. This imbalance in development would further inhibit
the other system leading to even more protracted development.
It would be interesting to study whether larger lOFC/rACC
gray matter volumes also suggest better emotional regulation
after controlling for the non-emotional components in an
experimental task.
The findings that emotional dysregulation and non-emotional
dysregulation may be inversely related to brain volume and
activation patterns in prefrontal regulatory networks suggest
that both dimensions should be assessed simultaneously. Thus,
endophenotype dimensions relating to emotional dysregulation
and non-emotional dysregulation as well as the emotional vs.
non-emotional aspects of different tasks must be taken into
consideration. This has rarely been done in studies of BPD
and ASPD. However, some research on CD in children has
tried to control for ADHD and even directly test for differences
between patients with ‘‘pure’’ CD vs. patients with ‘‘pure’’ ADHD
(Rubia, 2011). In a set of executive function tasks (Rubia, 2011),
children with ADHD activated PFC less than children with
CD, while on a reward task, children with CD showed less
activation in OFC than children with ADHD, as expected from
the neuropsychological profiles of the two disorders.
The balance between emotional and non-emotional processes
may also be discussed in relation to specific behaviors that
are altered in a set of psychiatric states. For example,
impulsivity (measured with self-rating questionnaires or
behavioral tests such as stop signal or go-no-go tests) has
been studied as a neurocognitive endophenotype marker
across disorders (Robbins et al., 2012). This suggests that
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a common underlying process related to impulse control
capacity could underlie different disorders. However, impulse
control is not a simply unitary construct (Robbins et al., 2012;
Sebastian et al., 2014). For example, in BPD, impulsivity is
associated with emotional distress and self-injurious behavior
while it is associated with both emotional and non-emotional
behaviors in ADHD (Sebastian et al., 2014). Thus, impulse
control and impulsivity may exist in both non-emotional and
emotional domains and represent different cognitive core
processes.
Even in the same cognitive task, different components
may fail in individuals with non-emotional dysregulation as
compared to individuals with emotional dysregulation. Evidence
for this was observed in the Imagen project (Schumann
et al., 2010) in which almost 2000 children underwent
structural and functional imaging scanning and a battery of
cognitive tests and clinical questionnaires. In a functional
imaging analysis of the stop-signal task, two main regressors
(indicating different phenotypes) were tested separately while
controlling for the other. One regressor involved misuse of
substances as an indicator of [emotional] impulsivity (associated
with emotional dysregulation; n = 1593) and the other
regressor quantified non-emotional ADHD traits (attentional
problems and impulsivity; n = 342; Whelan et al., 2012).
While there was no behavioral difference in performance
on the stop-signal test, the substance abuse regressor was
associated with hypoactivation in the lOFC during the stop-
success aspect of the trial while the ADHD-associated regressor
was linked to hypoactivation of bilateral inferior frontal
network and BG network during the stop-fail aspects of the
trials. Thus, this study suggests that different strategies are
used by subjects with emotional dysregulation tendencies vs.
non-emotional attentional dysregulation, possibly mirroring
an imbalance in the emotional vs. non-emotional regulatory
systems.
A DIVISION BETWEEN EMOTIONAL AND
NON-EMOTIONAL REGULATION BEYOND
PREFRONTAL AND CINGULATE CORTEX
Neuronal Circuitry—Prefrontal-Basal
Ganglia Loops
The PFC and ACC work in close connection with the
BG and specific neuromodulatory systems, including the
dopamine system, to accomplish cognitive computations such
as choosing specific behavioral responses, learning reward
associations and behaviors, and transforming new behaviors
into habits (Graybiel, 2008; Haber and Knutson, 2010; Haber
and Behrens, 2014). If emotional and non-emotional processing
can be partially differentiated, then so should prefrontal
interactions with BG and neuromodulatory systems. In line
with this idea, the distinction between OFC/rACC (including
vmPFC) and dlPFC/cACC is mirrored in the circuits linking
PFC/ACC with BG (Graybiel, 2008; Haber and Knutson,
2010; Haber and Behrens, 2014). The PFC-BG-thalamus-PFC
circuit is organized as parallel loops that are both segregated
and integrated (Graybiel, 2008; Haber and Knutson, 2010;
Haber and Behrens, 2014). While rACC/vmPFC and OFC
are particularly strongly connected with ventral striatum, the
cACC and dlPFC are strongly connected with dorsal striatum
in a graded manner (Graybiel, 2008; Haber and Knutson,
2010; Haber and Behrens, 2014). This allows a degree of
separation between reward processes, non-reward cognitive
processes and motor processes. As the loops interconnect, the
different dimensions can also interact with each other, as is
essential. In this way, this system allows a transformation from
reward guided responses and reward learning to behavioral
habits and compulsions (Graybiel, 2008; Robbins et al.,
2012).
Neuromodulatory Effects of Dopamine and
Reward Processing
The dopamine system is especially interesting in relation to
ADHD as it is altered in ADHD and the main pharmacological
treatments modulate catecholamines, including dopamine
(Swanson et al., 2007, 2011; Volkow et al., 2009). A similar
division between an ‘‘emotional’’ and a ‘‘non-emotional’’
dimension can also be discerned in the dopamine system as
for the prefrontal and BG circuits (Williams and Goldman-
Rakic, 1998; Björklund and Dunnett, 2007; Haber and Behrens,
2014; Figures 10A,B). Dopamine neurons are organized
as tiers of nuclei from the ventral tegmental area (VTA)
to the substantia nigra. While VTA neurons tend to reach
ventral striatum and the subgenual/rostral ACC (including
vmPFC), substantia nigra neurons tend to project to the
dorsal striatum and the dlPFC—also in a graded manner. The
described system allows for both segregated and integrated
processing at multiple levels (midbrain/dopamine, BG
and PFC/ACC) and is likely relevant to specific behaviors
related to ADHD and emotional instability disorders,
respectively.
Both associative and instrumental reward learning are
dependent on the ventral striatum, which signals reward
prediction errors via the dopamine system (Schultz et al., 1997;
Schultz, 2007). Functional imaging studies on humans support
this model (O’Doherty et al., 2003, 2006; Pessiglione et al., 2006).
The reward anticipation period is an important component of
this reward learning system (Haber and Knutson, 2010).
Numerous functional imaging studies have found that ADHD
patients show a decreased BOLD response in the ventral striatum
during the anticipation of rewards (Scheres et al., 2007; Strohle
et al., 2008; Stark et al., 2011; Carmona et al., 2012; Edel
et al., 2013; Furukawa et al., 2014; Kappel et al., 2015)—making
this one of the most robust paradigms in functional imaging
research on ADHD—but see von Rhein et al. (2015) and the
following discussion (Plichta and Scheres, 2015). Interestingly,
even the degree of subclinical ADHD symptoms has been
shown to correlate with striatal hypoactivity during reward
anticipation in a non-clinical sample (Stark et al., 2011). At
the same time, some studies have found a stronger response
to reward outcome either in striatum (Furukawa et al., 2014;
von Rhein et al., 2015) or in the OFC (Strohle et al., 2008) in
ADHD patients vs. controls. Together with hypofunction during
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FIGURE 10 | Connectivity between the dopamine system and basal ganglia (BG), and between the dopamine system and PFC. (A) The division between
different prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex systems is mirrored in BG organization and dopamine system projections to BG. Color-coded connectivity is shown
between dopamine neurons in the midbrain (lower part of the figure) and different parts of the BG (middle part of the figure; the ventral striatum in is shown in red and
dorsal striatum is mainly shown in yellow and green) (Haber and Behrens, 2014). The color-coded upper part of the figure indicates that while vmPFC/rACC and
orbitofrontal cortex are more connected to the ventral striatum, caudal ACC (cACC, here designated dACC) and dorsal PFC (dPFC) are more connected to the
dorsal striatum. (B) In primates a distinction between different prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex areas is also preserved in the dopamine system projecting
directly to the cortex (Williams and Goldman-Rakic, 1998; Björklund and Dunnett, 2007). Panel A is originally from Haber and Behrens (2014) and reprinted with
permission from Elsevier. Panel B is originally from Björklund and Dunnett (2007) and reprinted with permission from Elsevier.
reward anticipation, this suggests that ADHD patients are more
affected by immediate rewards than by future rewards. Although
a robust finding, the striatal reward anticipation dysfunction
observed in ADHD patients must remain tentative as emotional
instability traits have not been controlled for in most existing
ADHD studies. We speculate that the emotional dimension
of ADHD will be more related to the differential processing
of reward anticipation than the non-emotional dimensions.
Few studies have investigated this issue in emotional instability
disorders but initial studies show similar results in BPD and
ASPD (Vollm et al., 2007).
The decreased striatal BOLD signal in reward anticipation
observed in ADHD may be associated with the abnormalities
in delay aversion and temporal discounting that are often
observed in ADHD (Castellanos et al., 2006; Thorell, 2007;
Yu et al., 2015)—as all are related to processing of future
rewards (vs. processing an immediate reward). These processes
involve error signals from dopamine neurons in the VTA
(Haber and Knutson, 2010), also pointing towards dysfunction
in the emotional domain. In line with this reasoning, initial
studies have shown that emotional instability in CD is related
to increased temporal discounting unrelated to ADHD (White
et al., 2014). It would therefore be important to test how
reward anticipation relates specifically to the emotional vs. non-
emotional dimensions in ADHD. Interestingly, timing deficits
are highly problematic in non-emotional tasks in patients with
ADHD (Rubia et al., 2009) and may be more related to the ‘‘non-
emotional’’ dysregulation traits.
Initial studies suggest that the hypoactivation of ventral
striatum observed in reward anticipation is more expressed in
inattentive ADHD compared to combined type ADHD in adults
(Edel et al., 2013) suggesting that sub-categorization of ADHD
may be important in understanding how future rewards are
processed. In line with this, non-emotional trait impulsivity in
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 16 May 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 70
Petrovic and Castellanos Integrative Model of Top-Down Dysregulation
the general population is related to increased striatal activation
in the reward anticipation phase in contrast to hypoactivation
in ADHD (Plichta and Scheres, 2014). Different models have
been evoked to explain this discrepancy (Plichta and Scheres,
2014). However, an unmentioned possibility is that emotional
dysregulation may be linked to striatal hypoactivation in ADHD
but not to the trait-impulsivity of healthy subjects. This would
be in line with the finding that subclinical ADHD symptoms
are also associated with lower striatal activation during reward
anticipation (Stark et al., 2011). Thus, non-emotional trait
impulsivity and ADHD symptoms appear to be dissociated in the
general population in relation to reward processing.
INTEROCEPTION VS. EXTEROCEPTION
AS AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK
The differentiation of information processing into an
‘‘emotional’’ domain and a ‘‘non-emotional’’ domain may
be criticized in several ways. First, the definition of emotion is at
best weak. Emotion pertains to a subjective experience. However,
many associated processes that deal with threats, rewards, or
social signals are subconscious—but are also referred to as
emotional processes. Moreover, some fast behavioral responses
that are associated with threat or reward cues that may start
even before the emotional experience are also termed emotional
responses.
The common theme with all ‘‘emotional’’ processes is that
they are directly or indirectly associated with interoceptive
systems. While exteroceptive stimuli involve the external world,
interoceptive stimuli relate to the state of the body, its
needs and threats (Craig, 2002, 2009). Craig (2002, 2009) has
suggested that interoceptive information from the body directly
reaches posterior insula and cACC. Craig (2002, 2009) views
the posterior insula as the primary cortex for interoceptive
stimuli (‘‘primary interoceptive representation’’), and the cACC
as a limbic motor region. The interoceptive signal progresses
forward in the insula and is integrated with information
from various sensory modalities (via, for example, higher-order
sensory regions, the temporal pole and the amygdala) and
prefrontal input (including information from OFC) to form a
‘‘meta-representation’’ in the anterior insula. According to this
theory, such meta-representations form the moment-to-moment
emotional states that we experience subjectively (termed ‘‘global
emotional moments’’). These representations are considered
fundamental for emotional experiences.
Apart from interoceptive signals from the body being
re-represented to construct a subjective feeling state, emotional
states may be produced by top-down mechanisms that
directly activate emotional processes in anterior insula and
ACC. Similarly, exteroceptive signals may trigger conditioned
responses in these systems. It could be argued that such top-down
induced processes are closely associated to the interoceptive
system by analogy with visual imagination induced by top-down
systems. For example, increased activity in anterior insula and
ACC in empathy for pain overlaps with the activations induced
by nociceptive signals associated with the experience of pain
(Singer et al., 2004). The extent to which the top-down induced
activity in empathy for pain is related to the processing of
bottom-up nociceptive input is under debate (Singer et al., 2004;
Wager et al., 2013; Rutgen et al., 2015).
Top-down activated emotional processes may be also
indirectly associated to interoceptive systems through the
activation of bodily responses and induction of peripheral
perceptions (e.g., through emotional expressions and autonomic
responses), which in turn can provide interoceptive feedback to
‘‘hot’’ circuits (James, 1890; Damasio, 1993; Craig, 2002, 2009).
Thus, there is a tight relation between bottom-up and top-down
influences on emotional processes.
While it is not clear to what extent early interoceptive signals
are prone to modulation, it has been shown that all parts of
insula (posterior, mid and anterior) as well as cACC may be
regulated by top-down systems during processing of bottom-up
interoceptive input (Atlas and Wager, 2014) and processing of
top-down induced activation in the interoceptive stream (Singer
et al., 2006; Rutgen et al., 2015).
Apart from insula and ACC, several subcortical regions are
important for processing stimuli that are closely associated to
the bodily state. External signals related to threat and rewards
are not directly generated in the interoceptive environment
although they are of fundamental importance for survival.
Such signals are dependent on amygdala and ventral striatum,
sub-cortical regions that often are co-activated with insula
and ACC (Paulus et al., 2005; Paulus and Stein, 2006; Kable and
Glimcher, 2007; Milad and Quirk, 2012). Thus, amygdala and
ventral striatum form a tight network with cortical interoceptive
structures. Apart from a direct interaction with insula and ACC,
signals from amygdala and ventral striatum may also re-enter
the interoceptive loop through proprioceptive feedback from
behavior and autonomic responses related to fear and reward.
Therefore, the processing of certain external inputs in these
structures, including threats and rewards, may be viewed as
highly associated to the interoceptive dimension.
Given the difficulties of differentiating ‘‘emotional’’ and
‘‘non-emotional’’ processing, an alternative is a division into
one set of processes related only to the ‘‘exteroceptive’’
dimension and another set of processes associated to the
‘‘interoceptive’’ dimension focused on bodily survival and
homeostasis. Importantly, even in this type of division of
information processing, we note that exteroceptive information
interacts with interoceptive information at many stages of the
brain hierarchies.
The division between a network that is mostly focused on
exteroceptive processes and a network that is associated with
interoceptive processes (such as body states and the needs of the
bodily functions related to survival) suggests a demand for two
different regulatory functions as well. One proposal would be that
cACC and dlPFC regulate processes related to the exteroceptive
world, while rACC and lOFC regulate processes related to the
interoceptive world and its needs by controlling information
processing in insula, cACC, amygdala, ventral striatum and the
brainstem. As every individual acts in an external environment,
these networks need to interact at multiple levels. The division
between interoceptive and exteroceptive networks, including
their specific top-down regulatory systems, fits with the
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observation that some individuals have problems that relate
more to a specific dimension of top-down control such as ‘‘non-
emotional’’ regulation or ‘‘emotional’’ regulation. A testable
hypothesis derived from this reasoning is whether processing of
more classical interoceptive input is also dysregulated in subjects
with emotional instability.
AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF ADHD AND
EMOTIONAL INSTABILITY
We have presented a model in which ADHD and emotional
instability disorders (such as BPD, ASPD and CD) are
mechanistically related in that they all involve similar
dysfunctional top-down regulation of information processing.
We hypothesized that the difference between the classically
defined disorders (ADHD vs. emotional instability disorders)
is whether this dysfunctional regulation is related to emotional
(and interoceptively associated) processing or non-emotional
(and exteroceptively associated) processing (Hypothesis 1).
To probe this hypothesis, we have shown that it is possible
to divide these two dimensions of top-down control. In
summary, we have discussed that information processing in the
brain is highly dependent on complex reciprocal interactions
between multiple regions in large-scale networks (Mesulam,
1998, 2012; Engel et al., 2001; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011;
Siegel et al., 2012) rather than isolated processes in specific
regions (such as specific emotional and non-emotional regions).
Moreover, emotional and non-emotional networks cannot be
rigidly differentiated—since most tasks require subcomponents
that include both types of processes and information interacts
at every hierarchical stage. Finally, some structures may perform
information processing that pertains both to emotional and non-
emotional processes (Shackman et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the
clinical perspective suggests that some specificity must exist,
indicating that different networks focus on either emotional or
non-emotional processing that can be separated to a certain
degree. It is likely that each of these two putative networks
has a hierarchical perception-action organization (Fuster, 2000,
2004; Fuster and Bressler, 2012), where the highest levels
process more complex and temporally dispersed information.
In line with this view, we have reviewed research suggesting
that cACC and dlPFC perform similar types of information
processing for the non-emotional (and exteroceptive) processing
stream, as rACC and lOFC perform for the emotional
(and interoceptive) processing stream. Both top-down systems
interact with BG to choose and learn behaviors. Moreover,
specific parts of the dopamine system interact with the respective
system.
While it seems plausible to partially divide top-down
regulatory systems that are more specifically tuned to regulate
emotional and non-emotional processes, future research must
better understand the degree of specificity in these systems by
controlling for the other dimension—as few studies have done
so far. A prediction would be that cACC and dlPFC should
be more involved in top-down regulation of non-emotional
processes after controlling for emotional components while
rACC and lOFC should bemore involved in top-down regulation
of emotional processes after controlling for non-emotional
components.
Similarly, we have reviewed research suggesting that ADHD
involves dysfunction of cACC and dlPFC in non-emotional
top-down control while emotional instability disorders involve
dysfunction in rACC and lOFC in emotional regulation, in line
with the predicted hypothesis. However, these studies often suffer
from lack of control of the other dimension, which needs to be
addressed in future studies.
A related hypothesis predicts that the classically defined
phenotypes of ‘‘pure’’ ADHD and emotional instability disorders
should be unusual if the underlying processes are mechanistically
related—instead most patients will have both components in
different proportions (Hypothesis 2). Therefore, a dimensional
approach should better describe the problems of most patients.
In the present article we have highlighted research suggesting
that top-down regulatory capacities of the emotional and the
non-emotional systems vary in their efficiency among subjects
in the general population (Das et al., 2012; Petrovic et al.,
2015). An extremely poor cognitive core capacity in such top-
down regulation may be described as a dysregulation since
it would be associated with clinical symptoms and functional
loss. Dysregulation strictly encompassing the non-emotional
(and exteroceptive) processes would be related to ADHD,
while dysregulation strictly pertaining to the emotional (and
interoceptive) processes would be related to emotional instability
disorders (Figures 11A,B). It would therefore be possible to
describe both types of disorders on a two dimensional scale
where poor capacity for non-emotional regulation but normal
(or at least not handicapping) emotional regulation would be
associated with ADHD (Figure 11C). On the same scale, poor
capacity for emotional regulation but normal (or at least not
handicapping) non-emotional regulation would be associated
with emotional instability disorders such as BPD, ASPD or
CD. Comorbid states would have poor capacity for both non-
emotional and emotional processing. Emotional ADHD would
be explained as a disorder in which there is dysregulation of both
non-emotional and emotional processes (but to a milder degree).
However, these dysregulatory capacities are not independent. As
we discussed previously, there is a substantial overlap between
the disorders and a tight relation between degree of symptoms
both in patients and in healthy individuals in line with a
common underlying mechanism for all these clinical states.
Possibly, the best way to describe these clinical states is with
traits related to emotional dysregulation and traits related to
non-emotional dysregulation that are combined to different
degrees.
One possible primary candidate for a common substrate
that may incorporate both dimensions is the dopamine system.
This neuromodulatory system is implicated in ADHD (Swanson
et al., 2007; Volkow et al., 2009) and may affect both
emotional and non-emotional processing. The possibility that
the dopamine system may be similarly altered in both ADHD
and emotional instability disorders suggests that the same
treatment, i.e., dopaminergic agonists, may be efficacious for
both categories of disorders (Hypothesis 3). This idea is in
line with initial studies, suggesting that methylphenidate also
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FIGURE 11 | Model of relation between emotional and non-emotional top-down regulation in ADHD and emotional instability. (A) In classical ADHD,
top-down control of exteroceptive processes subserved by dlPFC and cACC and the associated dopamine system and dorsal striatum are dysfunctional (affecting
“cool” executive functions)—shown in light blue. (B) In emotional instability disorders [such as borderline personality disorder (BPD), conduct disorder (CD) and
antisocial personality disorder (ASPD)], the top-down control of interoceptive and emotional processes induced by orbitofrontal cortex OFC and rostral ACC and
associated dopamine system and ventral striatum are dysfunctional (affecting “hot” executive functions and emotional regulation)—shown in light blue. Instead of
representing two extreme variants, dysregulation in different individuals lies on a gradient extending from mostly non-emotional top-down control (all blue) to mainly
emotional top-down control (all red). (C) A two-dimensional model indicating “non-emotional” attention regulation capacity on one axis and “emotional” regulation
capacity on the other axis can incorporate ADHD, emotional ADHD and emotional instability disorders such as BPD, ASPD and CD.
has an impact on emotional dysregulation behaviors in ASPD
and CD (Kaplan et al., 1990; Brown et al., 1991; Klein et al.,
1997; Connor et al., 2000) as well as BPD (Schulz et al., 1988;
Golubchik et al., 2008; Prada et al., 2015; although see Schulz
et al. (1988) for possible issue with schizotypal comorbidity).
Interestingly, central stimulants also reduce behaviors related
to emotional impulsivity and instability in ADHD such as
suicide rate (Chen et al., 2014), drug use (Chang et al., 2014)
and criminal behavior (Lichtenstein et al., 2012)—possibly
indicating a specific effect on emotional dysregulation in ADHD.
One possibility is that there may be graded variability in
capacity of the dopamine system in the ventral vs. dorsal
tiers of dopamine neurons. This would then be mirrored
in and impact the whole regulatory brain network including
BG, ACC and PFC processing either emotional or non-
emotional related information. It would affect higher order
processing and regulation as well as brain structure on a longer
term.
Here, we have argued that there is a mechanistic relation
between ADHD and emotional instability disorders such as
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BPD, ASPD and CD. Perhaps emotional instability disorders
should not be regarded as personality disorders but as emotional
neuropsychiatric states. Also, using a dimensional approach,
characteristics of patients may be better described than using
standard categorical distinctions among psychiatric disorders.
This may both improve understanding of patients’ needs
and their treatment. However, the model presented here
is theoretical, and must be tested and scrutinized in detail. To
better understand how ADHD relates to emotional instability
disorders, traits must be measured in patients and healthy
participants and experimental studies must be designed that can
control for both non-emotional and emotional components of
different processes.
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